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DRUG TESTING OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
EMPLOYEES IN ALASKA
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 10, 1987, Kenai school bus driver Georgia Hodge
lost her job for refusing to submit to a urine test. I Ms. Hodge was not
concerned that her urinalysis would indicate drug use; rather, she ob-
jected on principle: "I'm not going to humiliate myself by peeing in a
bottle in front of anybody. I feel it's a violation of my constitutional
rights. It's a very humiliating thing to have to submit to."' 2
The firing of Georgia Hodge illustrates the conflicting policy con-
siderations that underlie the controversial issue of employee drug test-
ing. On one hand, Ms. Hodge was not suspected of drug use, and the
City of Kenai had no evidence that any of its school bus drivers were
using drugs. 3 On the other hand, Ms. Hodge's job falls into that cate-
gory of occupations in which the need for drug-free employees is most
evident. The City of Kenai had entrusted the lives of its children to
Ms. Hodge, and its desire that she not be under the influence of drugs
is understandable.
Drug testing in the workplace is becoming increasingly pervasive.
Close to half of the Fortune 500 companies have instituted or are con-
sidering instituting some type of alcohol and drug abuse testing proce-
dure.4 Many government agencies are also testing workers. 5 Both
private and public employers are responding to the enormous costs of
drug and alcohol abuse, which have been estimated as ranging be-
tween $60 billion a year 6 and $100 billion a year.7 The resulting costs
Copyright © 1988 by Alaska Law Review
1. Anchorage Daily News, Jan. 8, 1987, at B1.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Wood, Employee Drug Testing: Practical and Legal Considerations, 66 MICH.
B.J. 158 (1987).
5. President Ronald Reagan has required all federal agencies to adopt programs
designed to eliminate drugs from the federal workplace. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3
C.F.R. 224 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 7301 (Supp. 1987).
6. Castro, Battling Drugs on the Job, TIME, Jan. 27, 1986, at 43.
7. Note, Employee Drug Testing - Issues Facing Private Sector Emplocyers. 65
N.C.L. Ri.v. 832, 832 (1987) (citing D. Copus, ALCOHOL ANi DRUGS IN rTH"
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arise from, among other things, increased absenteeism and medical
claims, reduced productivity, increases in defective products, and
lower morale.8 Nearly forty percent of workplace deaths and one-half
of workplace injuries are directly related to drug or alcohol use. 9
This note analyzes the legal and practical problems facing Alaska
employers as they decide whether to test their workers for drug use. It
discusses private sector issues in light of Alaska labor law and then
focuses on the constitutional issues facing public employers. After a
survey of current federal drug-testing law, this note analyzes how the
broad rights of privacy10 and freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures" under the Alaska Constitution will affect the way in which
the Alaska courts respond to the drug-testing of public employees. Fi-
nally, this note discusses the practical considerations that underlie the
testing of employees and concludes by providing the employer with a
list of questions to consider before instituting such a program.
II. PRIVATE EMPLOYERS
A. Constitutional Issues
The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures in the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 12 does not apply
to actions by private employers.' 3 Similarly, the right of privacy ema-
nating from the federal Constitution regulates only state activity, not
private. 14 Although the rights of privacy and freedom from unreason-
able searches and seizures preserved by the Alaska Constitution 5 are
broader than those preserved by the federal Constitution,16 they still
WORKPLACE 1 (1986) (unpublished manuscript available from the National Employ-
ment Law Institute)).
8. D. Copus, supra note 7, at 4; Dugan, Affirmative Action for Alcoholics & Ad-
dicts, 5 EMPL. RELAT. L.J. 234, 238 (1979); Note, Workers, Drinks and Drugs: Can
Employers Test? 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 127 (1986).
9. Tyson & Vaughn, Drug, Testing in the Workplace, 50 OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY 24 (Apr. 1987). One survey has estimated that between 10%
and 23% of all workers use drugs at work. Note, supra note 7, at 1.
10. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
11. Id. § 14.
12. The fourth amendment provides in relevant part: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated .... U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (searches by employees of
private freight company not governed by fourth amendment).
14. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (right of pri-
vacy includes independence in making certain kinds of decisions without unjustified
government interference).
15. ALASKA CONST. art. I, §§ 14, 22.
16. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
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do not extend to intrusions that are not instigated under state
authority. 17
Because the Alaska courts have interpreted the individual liber-
ties embodied in the Alaska Constitution broadly, 18 private employers
should be forewarned that the Alaska courts may in the future expand
constitutional guarantees to include protection from private intrusion.
Indeed, one state has already expanded its explicit constitutional right
to privacy 19 to include private action. In Porten v. University of San
Francisco, 20 a California appeals court held that: "Privacy is protected
not merely against state action; it is considered an inalienable right
which may not be violated by anyone."' 21 The court found that the
purpose of the privacy amendment was to create "effective restraint on
the information activities of government and business."22 Even if the
Alaska courts do not follow California's lead, private employers
should still be aware of the constitutional standards discussed below23
because they may influence some areas of the employment
relationship. 24
B. Statutory Issues
Although drug testing within the private sector in Alaska is not
constitutionally prohibited, private employers face other legal hurdles.
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 25 unionized workers may
17. McConnell v. State, 595 P.2d 147, 151 (Alaska) (search and seizure provision
of constitution applies only to government action), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 918 (1979);
D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (state action required to present
constitutional question under privacy provision).
18. See infra notes 126-30, 158 and accompanying text.
19. CAL. CONST. art. I, § I provides: "All people are by nature free and in-
dependent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying anddefending life
and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and ob-
taining safety, happiness, and privacy." Id. (emphasis added).
20. 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976) (a case involving improper
disclosure of student records).
21. Id. at 829, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
22. Id. at 829 n.2, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 842 n.2 (quoting CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAM-
PHLET, at 26 (1972) (emphasis added)).
23. See infra notes 65-107 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. See also Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Engineers v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., No. 85-4137 (9th Cir. Feb. 11,
1988) (VESTLAW, CTA9 database) (extent of privacy protection under collective
bargaining agreement is influenced by fourth amendment).
25. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-158, 159-168 (1982). Also, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that the Railway Labor Act, 30 U.S.C.§§ 801-962 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), prohibited private railroad companies from uni-
laterally implementing mandatory drug-testing programs. Brotherhood of Locomo-
tive Engineers v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., No. 85-4137 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 1988)
(WESTLAW, CTA9 database).
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refuse to submit to drug testing if such testing constitutes a condition
of employment, thereby making it a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing.26 The National Labor Relations Board has yet to decide if drug
testing is a condition of employment. Until it does, employers may be
able to impose testing without prior bargaining under existing bargain-
ing agreement provisions that give management control over such
things as safety in the workplace and employee discipline. 27 Employ-
ers should be aware, however, that some arbitrators have forbidden
testing when employers have failed to notify their employees that they
may be subject to drug testing.28
The legality of drug testing has also been challenged on the basis
of Title VII,29 which prohibits discriminatory hiring practices. The
United States Supreme Court addressed employee drug use under Ti-
tle VII in New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer.30 The transit
authority had refused to hire persons using methadone, a narcotic
used to treat heroin addicts. The Court noted: "A prima facie viola-
tion of the Act may be established by statistical evidence showing that
an employment practice has the effect of denying the members of one
race equal access to employment opportunities. ' 31 Eighty-one percent
of the employees testing positive for methadone use were black or his-
panic. 32 The Court found that the employer had rebutted plaintiff's
prima facie case by establishing that its drug program bore a "manifest
relationship to the employment in question."' 33 The transit authority's
legitimate employment goals of safety and efficiency required the ex-
clusion of users of narcotics. 34 Also, the district court specifically
found that the employer was not motivated by any racial animus, fore-
closing any claim that the drug testing was a mere pretext for inten-
tional discrimination. 35 Thus, according to Beazer, although drug
testing ultimately may have a discriminatory impact, employers can
avoid Title VII problems by showing that the testing is job related and
by showing that racial animus played no part in the institution or ad-
ministration of the drug-testing program.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d) (1982).
27. See Note, supra note 8, at 138. Arbitrators have upheld testing in the absence
of prior bargaining. See, e.g., Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 80-1 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) 3264, 3265, 3285 (1979) (Randall, Arb.).
28. Capital Area Transit Auth., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 811, 815 (1977) (Ellman,
Arb.); Grief Brothers Corp., 79-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 4011, 4015 (1979)
(Whyte, Arb.).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982).
30. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
31. Id. at 584.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 587 n.31 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 587.
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Although the Alaska courts have not yet decided a drug-testing
case under the parallel state employment discrimination statute,36 the
Alaska Supreme Court has stated that this statute is "intended to be
more broadly interpreted than federal law to further the goal of eradi-
cation of discrimination. ' 37 Moreover, the Alaska Legislature in-
tended "to put as many 'teeth' into the statute as possible."' 38 The
requirement for rebutting the employee's prima facie case of discrimi-
nation, however, is no stricter under Alaska law than under federal
law. Alaska law similarly requires the employer "to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. '39
Once an employee has tested positive for drug use, the employer
may choose to provide counseling or therapy or may terminate the
employment. Those employers who wish to retain the option of firing
their drug-using employees must make sure that they do not violate
Alaska employment law.
C. The Employment-At-Will Doctrine
Alaska purports to be an employment-at-will state, which means
that an employer may fire an employee at any time for any reason. 4°
However, the Alaska courts have established major exceptions to the
general rule which may very well consume it entirely. In Eales v.
Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group, Inc.,41 the Alaska Supreme
Court established the good cause exception to the employment-at-will
rule. The court noted that an employee who has been hired for some
36. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (1986).
37. Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Prod., Inc., 601 P.2d 584, 585 (Alaska 1979).
38. McLean v. State, 583 P.2d 867, 869 (Alaska 1978).
39. Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Yellow Cab, 611 P.2d 487, 492
(Alaska 1980) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973)). An additional discrimination theory has been suggested by black police ca-
dets in The Shield Club v. Cleveland, 647 F. Supp. 274, 277 (N.D. Ohio 1986), rev'd
on other grounds, No. 86-4108 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 1987) (WESTLAW, CTA6 database).
Their theory is that melanin, a skin pigment, is frequently found in the urine of black
people and may be confused with the active ingredients in marijuana. The case has
been remanded to the trial court and is pending. Shield Club v. Cleveland, No. 86-
4108 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 1987) (WESTLAW, CTA6 database).
40. For a general discussion of the at-will rule in Alaska, see Crook, Employment
at Will: The "American Rule" and its Application in Alaska, 2 ALASKA L. REv. 23
(1985). The general rule is expressed in the often-quoted passage: "[Mien must be
left, without interference to buy and sell where they please, and to discharge or retain
employees at will for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad cause without
thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se." Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81
Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Waters, 132 Tenn.
527, 544, 179.S.W. 134, 138 (1915).
41. 663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983).
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definite period of time is not an at-will employee and may be termi-
nated only for good cause.42 The primary significance of the Eales
opinion is in its holding that the employer's representation to the em-
ployee that he would be retained as long as he properly performed his
duties precluded that employee from being fired except for good cause:
"This representation may be found to be a part of Eales' employment
contract, even if the employment contract was for an indefinite period
of time."'43 The court did not address the issue of what constitutes
such a representation, or whether such a representation may be im-
plied or must be expressly stated; however, since the courts may imply
from the employment contract an agreement that the employment is
for a definite period of time,44 it is reasonable to assume that an agree-
ment that the employee will not be fired as long as he properly per-
forms his duties may also be implied.
As a practical matter, the good cause exception to the at-will doc-
trine covers most employment situations. If an employee has been
hired for a definite period of time, he or she is protected by the good-
cause exception. If the employee is not hired for a definite period, the
employer must expressly state that the employment is in fact at will, or
the employer risks that a court will imply from the contract a repre-
sentation that the employee will not be fired provided he properly per-
forms his duties. Since the good cause exception covers most
employment situations, it is necessary to determine whether failure to
pass a drug test constitutes good cause.
A material breach of the express terms of the employment con-
tract constitutes good cause.45 The failure to obey a reasonable order
that is consistent with the contract is a material breach. 46 In Conway,
Inc. v. Ross,4 7 the Alaska Supreme Court focused on the express terms
of the contract in holding that a topless stripper could not be fired for
an act of prostitution because the terms of the contract did not pro-
hibit such conduct.48 Even the employee's admission that such a pro-
vision was "understood for every contract" was not sufficient to justify
42. Id. at 959. The employee had been offered a job until he reached retirement
age. The court decided this was sufficient to constitute employment for a definite
period of time.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 960. The court quotes from IA A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 152, at 14
(1963). If the employer made a promise, express or implied, not only to pay for the
service, but also to continue the employment for a period of time that is either definite
or capable of being determined, the employment is not terminable at will.
45. Central Alaska Broadcasting, Inc. v. Bracale, 637 P.2d 711, 713 (Alaska
1981).
46. Id.
47. 627 P.2d 1029 (Alaska 1981).
48. Id. at 1030.
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the termination.49 The policy justifications underlying this decision
were clarified by the Alaska Supreme Court in Rutledge v. Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co.,50 in which an employee was fired for fighting,
even though fighting violated none of the terms of the contract. The
court upheld a directed verdict in favor of the employer because an
employee handbook listed fighting as a possible ground for
termination. 51
An analysis of Conway and Rutledge in conjunction suggests that
the Alaska courts want employees to have prior notice of the possible
grounds for termination. Although including these grounds in the
contract provides effective notice, Rutledge establishes that notice in
some other form can be sufficient.5 2 To retain the option of firing an
employee who fails a drug test, an employer should include a drug-
testing provision in the employment contract. Alternatively, the em-
ployer should give notice in some form to the employee that refusing
to submit to a drug test, or failing a drug test, is grounds for
termination.
The Alaska Supreme Court has created a second exception to the
at-will doctrine by reading into every employment contract a covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. In Mitford v. de LaSala,53 the court
held that because of the implied covenant of good faith, an employee
with a profit-sharing incentive plan could not be fired for the purpose
of preventing him from sharing in future profits. The Mitford court
does not define the contours of the good faith exception, and whether
termination based on a drug test would violate this implicit covenant
is uncertain.5 4
Another possible exception to the at-will doctrine prohibits dis-
charges that contravene public policy. In Knight v. American Guard &
Alert, Inc., 55 the Alaska Supreme Court, though not expressly adopt-
ing the public policy theory, held that such an exception might exist in
Alaska. The court stated that "the public policy approach is largely
49. Id. at 1030 n.2.
50. 727 P.2d 1050 (Alaska 1986).
51. Id. at 1056.
52. Id. A leading case in this area is Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408
Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) (employee handbooks can give rise to contractual
rights). For a general discussion of employee handbooks, see Note, Employee Hand-
books and Employment-At-Will Contracts, 1985 DUKE L.J. 196.
53. 666 P.2d 1000, 1007 (Alaska 1983).
54. The case law from other jurisdictions indicates that the good faith exception
has not yet been applied to employee drug testing. See generally Note, Protecting At
Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good
Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980).
55. 714 P.2d 788, 792 (Alaska 1986); see generally Lopatka, The Emerging Law of
Wrongful Discharge - A Quadrennial Assessment of the Labor Law Issues of the 80's,
40 Bus. LAW 1, 6-17 (1984) (22 states prohibit discharges that violate public policy).
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encompassed within the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing."'5 6 However, because of Alaska's strong commitment to individ-
ual freedom, 57 a discharged employee in Alaska might have a stronger
argument under the public-policy exception than under the good-faith
exception. An employee could argue persuasively that although pri-
vate employers are not controlled directly by the Alaska Constitu-
tion,58 a discharge based on a search that unduly invaded his privacy
violates Alaska's public policy as embodied in its broad constitutional
guarantees. 59
In conclusion, although private employers who wish to test their
employees are less restricted than public employers, 60 they still face
significant legal hurdles. Because the Alaska courts have yet to ad-
dress the issue of employee drug testing, private employers should pro-
ceed with caution and consider the alternative responses to employee
drug use discussed below.61
III. PUBLIC EMPLOYERS
A. The United States Constitution
Historically, individuals were protected from unreasonable
searches and seizures only in the context of law enforcement. Re-
cently, however, the United States Supreme Court has been extending
the restrictions in the fourth amendment to government officials acting
in various civil capacities. 62 The Supreme Court also held recently in
O'Connor v. Ortega 63 that searches by government employers are sub-
ject to constitutional restraints. Thus, public employees not suspected
of criminal activity are protected by the fourth amendment.
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of em-
ployee drug testing, the lower federal courts have unanimously held
that such testing constitutes a search for purposes of the fourth
56. 714 P.2d at 792. In other jurisdictions, however, the public policy exception
is separate and distinct from the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See,
e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz.
1985); Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d
25 (1959).
57. See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text; see also Novosel v. Nationwide
Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 900 (3d Cir. 1983) (public policy exception may be based on
constitutional grounds).
60. See infra notes 65-107 and accompanying text.
61. See infra Section IV.
62. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985) (school officials); Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978) (Occupational Safety and Health Act in-
spectors); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (building inspectors).
63. - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1497 (1987) (plurality opinion).
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amendment.64 Because the Constitution prohibits only unreasonable
searches, it is necessary to analyze the balancing tests employed by the
federal courts to separate reasonable drug testing from unreasonable
drug testing.
The Supreme Court has stated that determination of the standard
of reasonableness requires "balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the
intrusion on the individual's [f]ourth [a]mendment interests against
the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the in-
trusion."'65 Traditionally, to be considered reasonable under the
fourth amendment, a search had to be authorized by a finding of prob-
able cause.66 However, the requirement is not absolute and "[w]here a
careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that
the public interest is best served by a fourth amendment standard of
reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, [the Court has] not
hesitated to adopt such a standard.1 67
In O'Connor, the plurality noted that the government as an em-
ployer has an interest substantially different from law enforcement,
which makes the probable cause requirement impractical: "The delay
in correcting the employee misconduct caused by the need for prob-
able cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated into tan-
gible and often irreparable damage to the agency's work."168 The
plurality held that the standard for judging the reasonableness of
work-related intrusions on the fourth amendment rights of govern-
ment employees is reasonableness under all the circumstances. 69 In a
caveat important for drug-testing purposes, the Court noted that it
was not deciding whether individualized suspicion is an essential ele-
ment of the reasonableness standard.70
64. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 176 (5th
Cir. 1987); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987); Division 241, Amal-
gamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029
(1976).
65. O'Connor, - U.S. at -, 107 S.Ct. at 1499 (quoting United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
66. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1972).
67. O'Connor, - U.S. at , 107 S.Ct. at 1501 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 341).
68. O'Connor, - U.S. at -, 107 S. Ct. at 1502. The government faces the same
problems in enforcing the criminal law. The Court seems to imply that the govern-
ment has a greater interest in seeing that an agency operates efficiently than it does in
protecting society from criminals. A better rationale for the Court's decision is that
the employee who is being searched will not be subject to criminal sanctions, only loss
of his job, and so a lesser constitutional standard is allowable.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1503.
1988]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
The requirement of individualized suspicion is important because
a drug-testing program will be more effective in exposing drug use if
employers can test randomly, without individualized suspicion. The
federal courts are split on whether individualized suspicion is a prereq-
uisite to drug testing. In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab,71 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit up-
held mandatory drug testing by a federal agency of all current employ-
ees who were seeking transfers to sensitive positions, regardless of
whether any of the employees were suspected of drug use. The court
noted that the fourth amendment imposes no irreducible requirement
of individualized suspicion.72
In applying its balancing test, the Fifth Circuit found that three
factors weighed heavily in favor of allowing the testing. First, the na-
ture of the job demanded that the employees be drug-free. The tested
employees were seeking positions as Customs Service agents who
would be involved in the interdiction of illicit drugs and who would
have access to classified information.73 Second, because the testing
was not to be used to bring criminal charges, the employee had a di-
minished need for protection against government intrusion.74 Third,
the test was voluntary; the employee could avoid it by not applying for
the transfer.75 Since the intrusion into the privacy of the tested indi-
viduals was limited, the court held that an employee not suspected of
drug use could be tested for drugs. 76
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reached
a similar result in Shoemaker v. Handel 77 The New Jersey Racing
Commission had instituted a program requiring horse jockeys compet-
ing at public race tracks to submit to breathalyzer tests daily and to
urine tests as often as three times a week. In upholding the testing, the
court applied a two-part test that required that the state must have a
strong interest in conducting an unannounced search and that the per-
vasive regulation in the industry must have reduced the privacy expec-
tation of the subject of the search.78 The strong interest claimed by
71. 816 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1987).
72. Id. at 176 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61
(1976)).
73. Id. at 173, 178. The court felt that drug users would be more susceptible to
bribes than non-users, would harm the public confidence in the service, and would
pose a greater danger to their fellow employees when carrying firearms. Id.
74. Id. at 178.
75. Id. The court, perhaps to a fault, downplays the employee's interest in earn-
ing a living and his interest in professional advancement.
76. Id. at 176. Petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1987. National Treas-
ury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 55 U.S.L.W. 3822 (U.S. 1987).
77. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 577 (1986).
78. Id. at 1142.
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the state to justify the testing was in "assuring the public of the integ-
rity of the persons in the horse racing industry. ' 79 The court satisfied
the second part of the test by noting that warrantless administrative
searches of the stable8 0 and testing of the horses8 I had occurred in the
past. The court concluded that such regulation had diminished the
jockey's expectation of privacy. 2
In McDonell v. Hunter, 8 3 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit upheld drug testing of correctional institution em-
ployees absent individualized suspicion of drug use. The court applied
the same two-part test and concluded that the state had a strong inter-
est in preserving prison security. The court further held that it is rea-
sonable to conclude that the very nature of corrections work
diminished the prison guards' expectation of privacy.84 Similarly, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
upheld mandatory testing of school bus attendants in Jones v. McKen-
zie. 8 5 The court held that it was reasonable to require drug testing of
employees who have a direct impact on the safety of young children. 6
The court also noted that the testing was part of annual medical exam-
inations87 and stressed the strong evidence which showed that a "drug
culture" existed among the group of tested employees.88
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit is the only federal appellate court to strike down a drug-testing
program because it was not based upon individualized suspicion. In
79. Id. Apparently, New Jersey has a strong interest in demonstrating to the pub-
lic that horse jockeys are not "subject to certain outside influences." Id. The court
does not tell us who or what these "certain" outside influences are. Note the similar-
ity to the Von Raab court's reasoning that federal agents are uniquely subject to brib-
ery and corruption. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170,
178 (5th Cir. 1987).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 138.
82. This reasoning seems to be a boot-strapping argument; the state justifies its
regulation by the very fact of its regulation. Even so, none of the prior regulations
approached the severity of warrantless searches of the jockeys' persons.
83. 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
84. Id. at 1308.
85. 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
86. Id. at 341.
87. Id. at 340. The court does not address what level of suspicion would be re-
quired for random testing outside the context of regularly scheduled medical examina-
tions. This court is the first to make such a distinction and the first to state that
testing only during annual medical exams "has the effect of ensuring that the intrusion
on the employee's privacy interest is minimized." Id.
88. Id. The court seems to create a new level of suspicion. It is not requiring
individual suspicion, but emphasizes that the employer had a generalized suspicion
that drug use existed among the group of employees in question.
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Railway Labor Executives'Association v. Burnley, 89 the court held that
federal regulations requiring drug testing of all railroad workers in-
volved in accidents were unreasonable. The court noted that tests
could be performed only if there were grounds for suspicion that a
worker was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 90 The court fur-
ther held that accidents by themselves do not create reasonable
grounds for suspicion that an employee was under the influence of
drugs.91
The Ninth Circuit agreed that the railroad workers, like the jock-
eys in Shoemaker, were voluntary participants in a highly-regulated
industry. However, the court distinguished Shoemaker on the
grounds that the government regulation in the railroad industry "has
always been geared to assuring the safety and proper maintenance of
equipment and facilities."' 92 Since government regulation did not af-
fect the workers personally, the court reasoned, the workers did not
have a diminished expectation of privacy. 93 This distinction is im-
proper, however, because the ultimate end of the government regula-
tion was the protection of public safety; proper maintenance of the
equipment and facilities was merely a means to that end.94 Also, the
court fails to mention that railroad workers have, in fact, been subject
to extensive government regulation for some 80 years.95 Finally, the
Ninth Circuit dismissed the other decisions upholding testing absent
individualized suspicion as being improperly reasoned.96
Significantly, while most federal appellate courts have upheld
testing absent individualized suspicion, the majority of district courts
have not. In Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 97 a district court in Ohio
explicitly declined to follow Von Raab. Though the court takes issue
with much of the Von Raab opinion, it ultimately holds that ordinary
police officers have greater expectations of privacy than do the Von
Raab plaintiffs who were applying for more "sensitive" Customs Ser-
vice positions.98






95. Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
97. 661 F. Supp. 578, 592 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
98. Id. at 592. The court expresses doubts as to the validity of the "voluntari-
ness" and "regulated industry" factors in Von Raab, and states that the Fifth Circuit
did not identify any employee interests. Id. However, the Feliciano court also does
not identify employee interests and does not explain why police officers have a greater
expectation of privacy than do Customs Service agents.
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In Capua v. City of Plainfield,99 a New Jersey district court re-
fused to follow its own court of appeals' decision in Shoemaker. The
court held that random testing of fire fighters and police officers was
unconstitutional absent reasonable suspicion. The court distinguished
Shoemaker on the grounds that fire fighters were not "voluntary par-
ticipants in a regulated industry" and had not been subjected to perva-
sive regulation. 100
In Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit
Agency, 101 a California district court held that bus drivers and mainte-
nance workers could not be tested absent reasonable suspicion.10 2 The
court concluded that the state's interest in the promotion of public
safety was outweighed by the employees' privacy interest in their bod-
ily waste.10 3 Two flaws existed in the testing program: the agency em-
ployed only about fifty workers and the court felt that the drivers
could be monitored by a "less draconian program"; and the agency
officials testing the workers had too much discretion as to whom they
tested.1 4 Importantly, the court leaves open the possibility that drug
testing absent individualized suspicion may be appropriate in some cir-
cumstances: "[T]his court can conceive of certain mass-transit set-
tings where mandatory drug and alcohol testing would be reasonable
under a more generalized quantum of proof."' 0 5
Without question, the cases discussed above cause considerable
confusion. For example, the Third Circuit has held that a state has a
sufficiently strong interest in preserving the appearance of integrity in
the horse-racing industry to justify random testing.' 0 6 During that
same year, a New Jersey district court within the Third Circuit held
that a state's interest in protecting the public safety does not justify
such testing in the field of fire protection.10 7 As a result of this incon-
sistency, an Alaska public employer cannot be certain whether a fed-
eral court will allow random testing or whether it will condition
99. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
100. Id. at 1519.
101. 663 F. Supp. 1560 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
102. Id. at 1568.
103. Id. at 1569.
104. Id. at 1568, 1569.
105. Id. at 1568 n.4.
106. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 107
S.Ct. 577 (1986).
107. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986). For other cases
banning drug testing in the absence of individualized suspicion, see, e.g., American
Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (civilian
employees of the U.S. Army in critical positions); Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp.
245 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (police officers); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp.
875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (fire fighters).
1988]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
testing on reasonable suspicion. Quite simply, in most public employ-
ment situations, a court could decide either way and have ample case
law to support its holding. The following section suggests a solution
to the problem, which Alaska public employers can use to design the
scope and procedure of their drug-testing programs and to defend
them in court.
B. A Proposed Solution to the Reasonable Suspicion Requirement
The constitutional standard for public employer intrusions on the
privacy interests of employees for non-investigatory, work-related pur-
poses is reasonableness under all the circumstances.108 This inquiry
necessarily involves a balancing of governmental interests against indi-
vidual interests, not only as to their relative importance, but also as to
the impact of the selected means of intrusion on each. In ruling on the
constitutionality of drug-testing programs, courts must make practical
determinations as to the real value of the alleged state interests and the
beneficial impact of drug-testing on these interests. At the same time,
courts must determine the employee's legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy and the extent to which drug testing intrudes on this privacy.
The application of this balancing test suggests that random,
mandatory drug testing should be justified by nothing less than the
state's interest in protecting the public's safety. 10 9 Because members
of society entrust their lives to public employees, such as law enforce-
ment officials and public transportation workers, society has a right to
demand that such state employees be drug free. In contrast, other
state interests less important than public safety, such as preserving the
appearance of integrity in a particular industry, should not justify a
search absent reasonable suspicion." 0
The Sunline Transit court, while acknowledging that public
safety might in some circumstances justify a search absent reasonable
suspicion,III found that because only fifty employees were at issue, the
transit agency could have monitored drug use by less intrusive means.
However, the court misses the significance of the nature of the bus
drivers' employment. Random drug testing is justified in this situation
because workers such as bus drivers are not subject to close supervi-
sion while performing their duties. The state has only a limited time
108. O'Connor v. Ortega, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1502 (1987).
109. Of course this does not preclude the possibility that drug testing may be nec-
essary for an interest greater than public safety, such as national security. It is the
position of this note that public safety is the weakest interest that will qualify.
110. Such an interest was used to justify a search absent individual suspicion in
Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d at 1142.
11I. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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to observe the employee and, therefore, will have inadequate opportu-
nity to form a reasonable suspicion of drug use. That the agency hires
only fifty people instead of 150 does not change this fact. Thus, a state
interest sufficient to justify random testing arises when employee drug
use will endanger the public safety and when insufficient opportunity
exists for the state employer properly to observe the employee and
form a reasonable suspicion of drug use." 2
In addressing the employee's privacy interest, several courts have
reasoned that if a particular industry has a history of heavy govern-
mental regulation, the employee in turn can expect a diminished ex-
pectation of privacy. 113 The weaknesses in this analysis are evident in
Shoemaker v. Handel. 14 The Shoemaker court concluded that since
New Jersey required jockeys to be licensed and required horses to be
tested, the jockeys came into the business with a diminished expecta-
tion of privacy as to their own bodies. These regulations, however, are
not of the same quality or severity as the intrusion implicated by urine
testing of the jockeys; the jockeys' expectations of privacy were, there-
fore, not diminished to an extent that would permit mandatory drug
testing."15
112. Such a formula probably will allow random testing of drivers but not mechan-
ics since mechanics are more amenable to supervision. Likewise, clerical workers in a
mass transit agency could not be tested without reasonable suspicion because no
threat to public safety exists. In Railway Labor Executives' Association v. Burnley,
No. 85-2891 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA9 database), the Ninth Circuit
failed to consider the public safety interests implicated by drug use of railroad
workers:
The majority in the instant matter has failed to engage in the balancing of
interests required by the [Supreme Court]. Instead, the majority focuses
solely on the degree of impairment of the workers' privacy interests. Find-
ing that the blood and urine tests are intrusive, the majority quickly pro-
ceeds to the conclusion that the tests are not justified at the inception
because they are not initiated as the result of individualized suspicion of
drug or alcohol use.
Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
113. See Shoemaker, 795 F.2d 1136; Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507
(D.N.J. 1986).
114. 795 F.2d at 1141, 1142.
115. The Shoemaker court claims to be following Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
594, 600 (1981). In that case, however, the Supreme Court merely allowed warrant-
less inspections of mines pursuant to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977,
30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Shoemaker court also mentions
the following cases as exceptions to the warrant requirement in highly regulated in-
dustries: United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (gun dealer's expectation of
privacy diminished by Gun Control Act); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,
397 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970) (liquor industry). In both of these cases, the diminished
expectation of privacy was directly limited to the specific areas of regulation. The
regulations did not affect privacy in general.
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Furthermore, trying to measure the pervasiveness of government
regulation when the government itself is the employer presents an
awkward analysis, as evidenced by Capua v. City of Plainfield. In its
holding that city fire fighters could not be tested randomly, the court
distinguished Shoemaker on the grounds that city fire fighters were not
"voluntary participants in a highly-regulated industry."' 16 Thus, gov-
ernment employees have an expectation that the government will reg-
ulate them less than it regulates some private-sector employees. The
court's analysis is indefensible, particularly in view of the critical role
that fire fighters play in protecting the public.
A more logical procedure of judging the employee's expectation
of privacy would be to analyze the nature of the job itself. If a job
places a particular employee in a position where members of the public
or co-workers depend upon him for their safety, the employee should
know that society has a greater interest in regulating his conduct and
in ensuring that he perform his duties free from the influence of
drugs.' 17 Thus, the analysis for the second part of the test, the deter-
mination of the employee's legitimate expectation of privacy, is con-
sumed in the analysis for the first part of the test, the state interests
implicated by the employment. If a public employee will be put in a
position in which other individuals are dependent upon him for their
safety, and if no other adequate means of supervision exist, then the
state has a sufficiently strong interest to test for drugs absent reason-
able suspicion. At the same time, the employee will have a diminished
expectation of privacy.
Two factors concerning the drug-testing procedure may help to
reconcile some of the conflicting results. The first concerns the actual
taking of the urine sample. In Capua v. City of Plainfield, the fire
fighters at issue were forced to urinate in the presence of a government
agent, which significantly heightened the intrusiveness of the search:
"The requirement of surveillance during urine collection forces those
tested to expose parts of their anatomy to the testing official in a man-
ner akin to strip search exposure." 18 Such intrusive surveillance is
unnecessary. For example, the Customs Service developed a proce-
dure that prevented tampering with the specimen but that did not in-
volve visual observation of the urination. The Von Raab court found
116. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1518 (quoting Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142).
117. Several courts have stressed the importance of the "voluntariness" of drug-
testing programs, reasoning that if the employee wishes to avoid being tested, he need
only work at jobs not requiring testing. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 178 (5th Cir. 1987); Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142. This
note proposes to drop this factor from the analysis on the grounds that it underesti-
mates the employee's need to earn a living and that it misunderstands the economic
realities facing most employees.
118. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1514.
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this fact significant in determining that the extent of the privacy intru-
sion was minimal.1 19
The second procedural factor often considered by the courts is
the amount of discretion given to the official in the field: "[R]andom
alcohol and drug tests.., provide officials with too much discretion to
be reasonable under the Constitution."' 120 However, this problem may
be rectified by restricting the testing to certain classes of employees121
or by eliminating discretion from the determination of who will be
tested. 22 The goal is to protect employees from government officials
who enjoy "almost unbridled discretion.., as to when.., and whom
to search."' 123 To help shelter their drug-testing programs from con-
stitutional attack, public employers should minimize the privacy intru-
sion and should safegilard the testing procedure from abuse by
government officials.
In conclusion, it is well established that under the United States
Constitution public employers with reasonable suspicion may test
their employees for drug use.' 24 The Supreme Court has intimated
that testing absent reasonable suspicion may be constitutional in some
circumstances, 25 and the lower federal courts seemingly are split on
the circumstances under which random drug testing is permissible.
This note takes the position that the standards elucidated by the
Supreme Court will be fulfilled best by a constitutional formulation
allowing testing in the absence of individualized suspicion when such
testing is necessary to further the state's interest in protecting the pub-
lic safety, provided that the state tests in a manner that intrudes mini-
mally on the employee's diminished expectation of privacy.
C. The Alaska Constitution
1. Search and Seizure. Alaska public employees are protected
from unreasonable searches and seizures not only by the fourth
119. Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 174. "The employee.., enters a restroom stall and
produces the urine sample. In order to prevent tampering, the observer remains in the
restroom to listen for the normal sounds of urination ... but the observer does not
visually observe the act of urination. The employee then leaves the stall and presents
the bottle containing the specimen to the observer. To insure that a previously col-
lected sample has not been proffered, the observer is instructed to reject an unusually
hot or cold sample." Id.
120. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F.
Supp. 1550, 1569 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
121. See Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 177, in which only those employees seeking trans-
fer to sensitive positions were tested.
122. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1143 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied -U.S. -,
107 S. Ct. 577 (1986) (testing done by lottery).
123. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978).
124. See supra notes 65-107 and accompanying text.
125. O'Connor v. Ortega, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1503 (1987).
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amendment of the United States Constitution, but also by article I,
section 14, of the Alaska Constitution.' 26 The Alaska courts have
construed the state constitution to provide broader privacy rights
under its search and seizure provision than those provided by the fed-
eral Constitution.' 27 Unlike the federal provision, the Alaska provi-
sion contains language which protects "other property,' 28 and the
Alaska Constitution contains an explicit guarantee of privacy.' 29
Therefore, even if drug-testing programs meet federal standards, they
also must not interfere with the freedoms preserved in the Alaska
Constitution, because, as to such liberties, "[federal] authority is ques-
tionable and . . . not persuasive as to the construction of Alaska's
analogous provision."' 30
The Alaska Supreme Court has held that a search or seizure is
unreasonable if a person has exhibited an actual, subjective expecta-
tion of privacy that society is prepared to accept as reasonable.' 3'
Although the Alaska courts have yet to address employee drug testing,
they will likely hold that such activity constitutes a search for pur-
poses of article I, section 14. Because of the expansive reach of that
provision, the Alaska courts may allow drug testing in fewer circum-
stances than do the federal courts. In an effort to forecast how the
Alaska courts will respond when the issue is brought before them, this
Section analyzes Alaska search and seizure cases arising out of situa-
tions analogous to employee drug testing.
The Alaska courts have repeatedly stated that "a search without
a warrant is per se unreasonable unless it clearly falls within one of the
narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement."'' 32 One ex-
ception is exigent circumstances, which the Alaska Supreme Court
used in Schultz v. State '33 to allow the entry of fire fighters into the
defendant's house. The Schultz court found a "compelling need for
official action and no time to secure a warrant."'' 34 Drug testing might
126. ALASKA CONsT. art. I., § 14.
127. See, e.g., Ellison v. State, 383 P.2d 716, 718 (Alaska 1963); see also Zehrung v.
State, 569 P.2d 189, 199-200 (Alaska 1977) (holding that property inventory of ar-
restees constitutes search under section 14, even though it does not under the fourth
amendment).
128. Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, 565 P.2d 138, 148 (Alaska 1977).
129. Id.; ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 22. The United States Supreme Court has rec-
ognized the power of the states to create broader rights of privacy than existed under
the federal Constitution. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
130. State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 874-75 (Alaska 1978).
131. See Glass, 583 P.2d at 875; Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793, 796-97 (Alaska), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1086 (1973). Mr. Justice Harlan used this standard in his concur-
rence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
132. See, e.g., Woods & Rohde, 565 P.2d at 149.
133. 593 P.2d 640 (Alaska 1979).
134. 593 P.2d at 642 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)).
[Vol. 5:133
EMPLOYEE DRUG TESTING
similarly qualify under this exception if the employer can show that it
is necessary to test an employee immediately to protect the public
safety. For example, public transportation employers could argue that
exigent circumstances are always present. The danger to public safety
creates the compelling need for official action and the nature of the
danger provides no time to secure a warrant. The exigent circum-
stances exception, however, has been restricted to unforeseen emergen-
cies and unexpected dangers.135 Allowing a comprehensive drug-
testing program would require an expansion of this exception.
A second exception to the warrant requirement is the abandon-
ment doctrine, under which an individual relinquishes the right of pri-
vacy in property he abandons 1 36 To abandon property, one must
clearly indicate "an intention to relinquish all title, possession, or
claim to property."'137 It is unlikely, however, that the Alaska courts
will hold by way of analogy that an employee has the requisite inten-
tion to abandon urine that has been produced for testing purposes.
A third exception allows a search in the absence of a warrant if
the individual consents.' 38 The Alaska courts define consent nar-
rowly: "Consent to a search... must be unequivocal, specific and
intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress and coercion, and is
not to be lightly inferred."' 139 In State v. Salit, 140 the Alaska Supreme
Court held that consent may not be implied from the mere fact that
persons are on notice that they may be searched. This holding sug-
gests that merely putting a drug-testing provision in an employment
contract might not constitute consent. Thus, even if an employee ex-
presses consent to a drug-testing provision, the courts may view the
imbalance of power in the employer-employee relationship as coercive.
The final exception allows warrantless administrative searches
where specifically authorized by statute. 141 Thus, the Alaska Legisla-
ture could in fact authorize warrantless administrative searches of
public employees.142 An example of such legislation has occurred on
135. See generally Tyler, 436 U.S. 499.
136. Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793, 795 (Alaska 1973).
137. Id. at 796 (quoting Mascolo, The Role ofAbandonment in the Law of Search
and Seizure: An Application of Misdirected Emphasis, 20 BUFF. L. REv. 399, 401
(1970)).
138. Erickson v. State, 507 P.2d 508, 515 (Alaska 1973).
139. Id. (quoting Sleziak v. State, 454 P.2d 252, 257-58, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 921
(1969)).
140. 613 P.2d 245, 254 (Alaska 1980).
141. State v. Salit, 613 P.2d 245, 250 (Alaska 1980).
142. The legislature would have to follow the guidelines set out in Woods &
Rohde, Inc. v. State, 565 P.2d 138, 145 (Alaska 1977). Not all administrative searches
are constitutional; indeed, the holding in Woods & Rohde was that warrantless
searches pursuant to the state OSHA regulations are not constitutional. Id. at 151.
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the federal level. In 1974, Congress passed the Air Transportation Se-
curity Act ("ATSA"), which requires screening for weapons of all pas-
sengers and their luggage, even absent individualized suspicion. 43
Congress passed ATSA in response to a dramatic increase in hijack-
ings. In State v. Salit, the Alaska Supreme Court held that warrantless
searches conducted pursuant to ATSA did not violate the Alaska Con-
stitution. "[W]here ... regulatory inspections further urgent federal
interest, and the possibilities of abuse and the threat to privacy are not
of impressive dimensions, the inspection may proceed without a war-
rant.... "144 The great dangers presented to the public by hijackings,
and the absence of any other viable response to the problem, necessi-
tated mandatory searches of all passengers. The court recognized that
searching all passengers was an "extraordinary response to an ex-
traordinary situation," 145 but noted that "the fourth amendment per-
mits necessary responses to new dangers."1 46
The hijacking situation is somewhat analogous to drug abuse in
the workplace. The government has a strong, if not urgent, interest in
controlling drug use in the workplace. 147 Similar safety and health
dangers to the public exist, and, at least in some types of public em-
ployment, it may be impossible for the government to combat the
problem through less intrusive means. 48 Urine testing is perhaps a
more intrusive invasion than the weapon-detecting procedures em-
ployed under ATSA; however, the search of airline passengers often
includes hand searches of luggage, 149 searches that are more than min-
imally intrusive. Also, ATSA. requires searching passengers, who, as
private citizens, have a much greater expectation of privacy than do
public employees. Thus, state legislation allowing public employers to
143. This statute enacted 49 U.S.C. §§ 1356, 1357 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) and
amended 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1472, 1511 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
144. Salit, 613 P.2d at 251 (quoting United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317
(1982)).
145. Id. at 250.
146. Id.
147. See infra notes 4-9 and accompanying text. Marijuana use by the pilot was
implicated in a recent fatal commercial airline crash. Yesavage, Leirer, Denari & Hol-
lister, Carry Over Effects of Marijuana Intoxication on Aircraft Pilot Performance: A
Preliminary Report, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1325, 1325 (1985). The government is
willing to search all passengers to protect them from being injured or killed by hijack-
ers; however, passengers must also be protected from impaired pilots. See also Note,
supra note 7, at 832 (drug and alcohol use implicated in 37 deaths in the railroad
industry).
148. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
149. State v. Salit, 613 P.2d 245, 247 (Alaska 1980).
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impose mandatory drug testing may very well pass constitutional stan-
dards, especially if the legislation limits the scope of the testing to "the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible."' 150
If public employers want to test their employees randomly for
drug use, they must lobby for legislation. Otherwise, public employers
must wait until they have reasonable suspicion that a particular em-
ployee is using drugs. In the absence of statutory authority, even a
minimally intrusive search must be based on reasonable suspicion.
151
It should be noted that in D.R. C. v. State 152 the Alaska Court of
Appeals held that government officials who were not involved in law
enforcement were not subject to the fourth amendment or to section
14. Technically, this case is still good law, and it supports the premise
that a government employer would be able to test his employees com-
pletely free of search and seizure limitations. However, subsequent to
D.R. C., the United States Supreme Court held in New Jersey v.
T.L. 0. 153 that school officials are restrained by the fourth amendment,
directly contradicting the holding in D.R.C. Since Alaska's search
and seizure protections have always been interpreted to extend at least
as far as the federal protections, 154 the Alaska courts might disregard
the D.R. C. ruling and hold government officials acting outside the
scope of law enforcement subject to section 14.
2. The Right to Privacy. The privacy amendment of the Alaska
Constitution, article I, section 22, has been applied to situations that
do not fit within the traditional law enforcement search and seizure
framework. 155 Although the Alaska courts will probably analyze pub-
lic employer drug testing as a search,156 they undoubtedly will do so in
light of their prior decisions under the privacy amendment. This sec-
tion analyzes the scope of the right to privacy under section 22, partic-
ularly as it relates to the right of public employees to be free from drug
testing.
150. Id. at 251 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). It should also be
noted that the testing must not be used to impose criminal penalties. Id.
151. Pooley v. State, 705 P.2d 1293, 1311 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (criminal case).
152. 646 P.2d 252, 256 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
153. 469 U.S. 325, 334-35 (1985).
154. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text. See also Lowry v. State, 707
P.2d 280, 285 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (noting that D.R.C. was incorrectly decided).
155. See, e.g., Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1980) (privacy may include
anonymity with respect to ballot advertising); Gunnerud v. State, 611 P.2d 69 (Alaska
1980) (release of psychiatric report subject to privacy protection where irrelevant to
issue of witness's credibility); Falcon v. Alaska Public Offices Comm'n, 570 P.2d 469
(Alaska 1977) (doctor-patient relationship); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska
1975) (consumption of marijuana in the home).
156. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
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Section 22 cases are important in forecasting how the Alaska
courts will respond to employer searches because the standards under
section 14 and section 22 are identical: for a search to be invalid, there
must be an actual expectation of privacy, and this expectation must be
one that society is prepared to accept as reasonable. 157 The balancing
test employed by the Alaska courts to determine what privacy expec-
tations are protected differs substantially from the federal test:
"Under the language of the federal cases, it must be found that the
privacy invasion is necessary to a compelling state interest .... Under
the Alaska Constitution, the required level of justification turns on the
precise nature of the privacy interest involved." 158 Thus, the Alaska
courts apply a more flexible test than the two-tier constitutional analy-
sis employed by the federal courts. Also, while the federal test focuses
on the needs of the state, Alaska's test is more concerned with the
individual.
The public employee can assert several privacy interests that drug
testing will invade. The employee can argue that the right to privacy
includes the right to do as one pleases in the confines of one's home
and that drug testing violates this right because it divulges not only
work-related drug use, but also off-duty drug use. 1 9 Although the
right to privacy protects people and not places, the Alaska Supreme
Court has preached on the sanctity of the home: "If there is any area
of human activity to which privacy pertains more than any other, it is
the home." 160 In Ravin v. State, 16 1 the supreme court held that Alaska
citizens have a right to consume substances such as marijuana in non-
commercial contexts in the home. Thus, since urinalysis cannot dis-
tinguish between marijuana use during work hours and marijuana use
off-duty, drug testing as a prerequisite for public employment may vio-
late this right. This victory is a narrow one for the public employee
because the Alaska courts have also held that the right to privacy does
not extend to the non-commercial use of cocaine, 162 or, interestingly
enough, alcohol. 163
However, the mere fact that drug testing may detect activities oc-
curring in the privacy of one's home does not make it unconstitu-
tional. Although in Ravin v. State the Alaska Supreme Court held
157. State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 875 (Alaska 1978).
158. Falcon, 570 P.2d at 476.
159. Marijuana may be detected for as long as 20 days after consumption. Panner
& Christakis, The Limits of Science in On-The-Job Drug Screening, 1986 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 7, 9 (Dec.).
160. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 503 (Alaska 1975).
161. Id. at 504.
162. State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978).
163. Harrison v. State, 687 P.2d 332 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
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that personal consumption of marijuana in the home is constitution-
ally protected, 164 the right of privacy in Alaska is not absolute. 165 The
Ravin court stated that the right does not include any activity, even in
one's home, which will affect that individual or others adversely. 166
The right of privacy must yield when the activity affects the public
health and general welfare. 167 Thus, the state may prohibit driving
while under the influence of marijuana, 168 the possession of marijuana
in a public place, 169 and the possession of marijuana by a minor.170
To say that disciplining an employee for off-duty drug use violates
the right of privacy implies that such use does not affect job perform-
ance. However, when a public employee consumes marijuana in the
home and then proceeds directly to his employment, certainly that
conduct has lost its wholly private character. It is not clear how much
time must elapse between use of the drug and the beginning of the
public activity before the drug use becomes wholly private. Current
medical evidence indicates that marijuana causes severe long and short
term physical and mental effects:
[M]any drugs cause significant impairment for several hours or days
after ingestion .... Illegal drugs lack any assurance as to potency
or contaminants, and therefore, may create potential safety and per-
formance problems long after ingestion.... Thus, off-the-job drug
use may have on-the-job consequences, especially when used by em-
ployees who hold jobs of trust or high responsibility or who work
with potentially dangerous machinery. 17 1
The length of the impairment cannot be predicted accurately because
it depends upon the physical make-up of the individual and the po-
tency of the drug. 172 Because marijuana can cause severe, permanent
impairment, the state has a sufficient interest in testing its employees,
particularly those in safety-related jobs, even if the testing cannot dis-
tinguish between on-duty and off-duty drug use.
164. 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975).
165. Falcon v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm'n, 570 P.2d 469, 476 (Alaska 1977).
166. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 511.
169. Belgarde v. State, 543 P.2d 206, 207 (Alaska 1975).
170. Id.
171. Tyson & Vaughn, Drug Testing in the Workplace, 560 OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY 24, 26 (Apr. 1987). Marijuana smoke contains more carcino-
gens and more tar than does cigarette smoke. Possible effects of marijuana include
alterations in immune system function, cellular chromosomes, and cell metabolism;
abnormalities in the reproductive system or in development of the fetuses of mari-
juana-smoking pregnant women; cardiovascular system alterations; and changes in
brain histology. Schwartz, Marijuana: An Overview, 34 PEDIATRIC CLINICS OF
NORTH AM. 305, 310 (Apr. 1987).
172. City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1-322, 1325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
1988]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:133
Furthermore, the Ravin decision is weakly supported 173 and
based on the then-current scientific evidence concerning marijuana:
"It appears that there is no firm evidence that marijuana, as presently
used in this country, is generally a danger to the user or to others."' 174
Even assuming that Ravin is still good law, drug testing of public em-
ployees should not be precluded by Ravin because of new medical evi-
dence showing the harmful effects of off-duty drug use on job
performance. 175
The employee can also argue that drug testing invades an em-
ployee's privacy because it exposes to others the personal information
that body fluids contain. Urinalysis may disclose whether the em-
ployee is diabetic, pregnant, under treatment for depression or epi-
lepsy, and it may reveal the use of other prescribed medication. 176 The
federal courts have stated that "each individual has a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the personal 'information' bodily fluids con-
tain."' 177 Similarly, the Alaska courts have held that information
concerning an individual's medical condition and treatment is pro-
tected by the right to privacy: "An individual's physical ills and disa-
bilities and the medication he takes... are among the most sensitive of
173. In Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524, 528 (Alaska 1974), the Alaska Supreme Court
noted that there was no available recorded history of the privacy amendment. The
court then, in dictum, stated that "clearly it shields the ingestion of food, beverages or
other substances." Id. The court did not state why this fact is so clear, and it pro-
vided no support for its conclusion. A right to ingest substances is so far removed
from prior Alaska law and the federal right to privacy, that the court should not
create such a right in the absence of some legislative or constitutional intent. The
Ravin court bases its opinion on this dictum in Gray. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 502.
174. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 508. The most common type of marijuana used today is
six times more potent than the marijuana of the 1970's. Schwartz, supra note 157, at
315.
175. A preliminary study concluded that marijuana caused impairment of airline
pilots up to 24 hours after ingestion. The pilots were tested on a flight simulator
landing task. The pilots showed significant impairment in many variables, including
distance off center in landing, and vertical and lateral deviation on approach. Despite
these deviations, the pilots reported no awareness of their own impaired performance.
Yesavage, Leirer, Denari, & Hollister, supra note 147, at 1328. In Railway Labor
Executives' Association v. Burnley, No. 85-2891 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 1988) (WESTLAW
CTA9 database), the Ninth Circuit found that the drug testing plan was not reason-
ably related to its stated purpose because the tests cannot measure current intoxica-
tion. Id. This objection may be insignificant in light of medical evidence showing that
impairment may last well beyond the actual intoxication.
176. National Treasury Employees Union v.Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 176 (5th Cir.
1987); see also Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., No. C84-230 (Cal. Sup. Ct., San
Francisco County 1985) (employee discharged because she refused to submit to testing
through fear that her pregnancy would become known to the company).
177. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, No. 85-2891 (9th Cir. Feb. 11,
1988) (WESTLAW, CTA9 database); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507,
1513 (D.N.J. 1986).
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personal and psychological sensibilities." 178 Therefore, public employ-
ees in Alaska do, in fact, have the right not to have their physiological
secrets exposed through drug testing.
However, the potential disclosure of personal facts concerning the
employee's physical and emotional state does not necessarily preclude
drug testing. The dissemination of personal information may be re-
stricted such that the invasion of privacy is minimal. The testing
should be performed on anonymous samples by an independent labo-
ratory, which should report to the employer only the test results relat-
ing to drug use, not the results that might indicate other personal
information about the employee. The test results should not be dis-
closed to any individual outside the employment relationship and
should be disclosed internally only on a "need-to-know" basis. 179 In
this way, the amount of personal information disclosed is strictly tai-
lored to meet the needs of the drug-testing program, and the informa-
tion is disclosed to the fewest people possible. 80
A third ground for attack is that the process itself is an unconsti-
tutional invasion of privacy. In ruling upon the validity of drug tests,
the federal courts have analyzed the intrusiveness of the actual testing
procedure.' 8 ' The employee may argue that forced urination is an in-
vasion of one's personal dignity comparable to a strip search or body
cavity search, and that the severity of such an invasion outweighs any
justification the state can assert. 18 2 The employee may also argue that
the inaccuracies inherent in presently available drug-testing techniques
violate procedural due process. 183
The drug-testing procedure may, however, be conducted so as to
preserve the dignity of the employee and to satisfy procedural due pro-
cess requirements. Most importantly, urinalysis should not involve a
178. Falcon, 570 P.2d at 478 (1977) (quoting Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931,
937 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)).
179. D. Copus, supra note 7, at 56; see also Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v.
Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 962 (1977)
(empiloyee awarded $200,000 for defamation because employee's test results, which
were later found to be inaccurate, were publicized throughout the company and to
outsiders).
180. See Gunnerud v. State, 611 P.2d 69, 72 (Alaska 1980) (invasion of privacy
would have been allowed if the evidence had been relevant to trial).
181. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
183. Even the most accurate drug screening tests have significant false-positive
rates. The sophisticated and widely used radioimmunoassay blood test may yield
false-positive rates of 43% for cocaine, 21% for opiates, 51% for marijuana, and 42%
for barbituates. The most widely used urinalysis procedure is the EMIT, which has
false-positive rates of 10% for cocaine, 5.6% for opiates, 5.1% for barbituates, 12.5%
for amphetamines, and 19% for marijuana. Panner & Christakis, supra note 159.
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witness observing the subject while the specimen is provided. Employ-
ers have developed procedures to protect the specimen from adultera-
tion that do not involve an undue invasion of the employee's
privacy. 184 To satisfy due process, proper care must be taken to pre-
serve the chain of custody during the collection, shipping, and testing
of the samples. Proper chain of custody includes ensuring both the
identity and the integrity of each sample. The testing should be per-
formed by qualified, outside professionals. Although some drug detec-
tion systems can be performed at the job site,I85 such systems may lead
to confidentiality and accuracy problems.18 6
Due process also requires specific guidelines that protect employ-
ees from abuse of the system by the employer. The testing program
should outline specifically the class of employees subject to testing and
the method by which each employee is chosen for testing.1 87 The test-
ing procedure should provide for a second test by a different method
to check all positive test results,1 88 and the employer should preserve
the specimen to allow the employee to have it tested independently.1 89
In short, drug testing of employees may be conducted so that it
does not violate the employee's right to privacy. In the absence of
legislation, however, it is unlikely that the Alaska courts will allow
random drug testing under the search and seizure provision. Employ-
ers will probably be restricted to testing only on the basis of reasonable
suspicion. In a best case scenario, reasonable suspicion will arise from
unusual behavior, slurred speech, or other similar conduct. Reason-
able suspicion may not arise so harmlessly, however. The testing pro-
gram developed for the City of Kenai school bus drivers called for
testing after any accident.1 90 Needless to say, in such an event, the
testing very well may be too late.
IV. CONCLUSION
In deciding whether to test their employees for drug use, both
private and public employers face a great deal of legal uncertainty.
This uncertainty makes the development of a drug-testing program
184. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
185. Note, supra note 7, at 838.
186. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded
that by administering drug tests in hospitals, the employer prevented the tests from
being an unreasonable search. Division 241, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy,
538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
187. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
188. For example, the false-positive rate for a two-stage analysis using EMIT fol-
lowed by thin-layer chromatography is approximately 2-3%. This procedure costs
about $50 per sample. Panner & Christakis, supra note 159, at 9.
189. Banks v. Federal Aviation Admin., 687 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1982).
190. Anchorage Daily News, Jan. 8, 1987, at BI.
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difficult, and it gives employers ample reason not to test at all. With
the caveat discussed above in Section II, private employers in Alaska
should be able to test their employees. Public employers, on the other
hand, will probably be able to test certain employees only on the basis
of reasonable suspicion. However, even if the Alaska courts do in fact
allow testing, employers must consider several other factors:
(1) Will the testing be cost effective? Urine can be tested for a
limited number of drugs for about $10 to $25 per specimen. Ade-
quate confirmation tests, however, cost two to five times more for
each drug requiring identification. 19
(2) How will employees react? The implementation of a drug test-
ing program may lower morale and irreparably harm worker-man-
agement relations.
(3) Can drug abuse be detected by other measures? Closer super-
vision may make actual testing unnecessary, especially for non-criti-
cal workers.
(4) Besides facing constitutional challenges, will drug testing ex-
pose the employer to other types of legal liability, including defama-
tion,192 negligence,193 and wrongful discharge? 194
If after considering these other pertinent issues, an employer still
decides to test its employees, the employer should then consider the
following guidelines:
(1) Decide Whom to Test: Because of the expense and the poten-
tial legal liability involved with testing, employers should test only
when necessary. Proper supervision should suffice for many non-
critical workers. For workers who cannot be supervised adequately
and who occupy safety-sensitive positions, the employer must de-
cide whether to test randomly or only on the basis of reasonable
suspicion;
(2) Notify Employees: Before implementing a testing program,
present employees should be notified as far in advance as possible to
minimize resentment and to help protect the program from legal
attacks. All job applicants should be notified that they will be sub-
ject to testing. Along with notification, it should be explained to the
employees why such testing is necessary;
(3) Union Sector: Testing is such a sensitive matter that even if it
is held not to be a mandatory subject of bargaining, employers
should still seek union support for the program;
191. McBay, Efficient Drug Testing: Addressing the Basic Issues, 11 NOVA L. REV.
647, 648 (1987). An NCAA plan to test college athletes for 81 drugs is estimated to
cost $1,000 per athlete. Id.
192. See Armstrong v. Morgan, 545 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
193. See Herman & Bernholz, Negligence in Employee Drug Testing, 92 CASE &
COMMENT 3 (1987).
194. See supra notes 25-57 and accompanying text.
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(4) Testing Procedure: The integrity of the sample should be en-
sured without visual observation of the urination. All positive first
tests should be confirmed by a second, more accurate test. Analysis
of the specimen should be performed by a reputable laboratory,
with chain of custody adequately protected;
(5) The Drug Abuser: Employers should receive greater employee
support for the program if they provide rehabilitation for those who
test positive. Rehabilitating the affected employee actually may be
less costly than training a new employee, and should operate to im-
prove worker-management relations.
Richard N. Cook
